To investigate the effect of reputation on auditor business decisions, we look at the relationship between auditor reputation and the characteristics of the IPOs that auditors take to the market. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that: 1) More prestigious auditors are associated with IPOs that seetn a priori less lisky: 2) the market perceives as less risky the IPOs that are associated with more prestigious auditors; and 3) IPOs' long-term performance is related to the prestige of the auditor employed.
• This study examines the relationship between auditor quality and the characteristics ot the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) associated with it. Analyzing this relationship is interesting for at least two reasons. First, IPOs exhibit an average first-day return that cannot be explained by the standard risk-return tradeoff. Ibbotson. Sindelar. and Ritter (1988) , for example, find that the average first-day IPO return is 16.3% in the years . Several reasons have been proposed to explain why a firm would willingly underprice its securities and limit the funds received. Many of these reasons rely either on contractual problems between the parties involved (e.g.. Baron. 1982) or on asymmetric information (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber, 1989, and Rock, 1986) . A common feature in these explanations is that lower uncertainty reduces the need for underpricing. The presence of a prestigious auditor may serve as an effective vehicle to reduce uncertainty about future cash tlows of the newly traded firm (Balvers, McDonald, and Miller; Beatty, 1989; and Titman and Trueman. 1986 ) and, consequently, underpricing.
The ability of a firm to convey quality through the selection of the auditor is similar to that of the selection of the firm's underwriter. For example, Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest that the underwriter can, through repeated business in the IPO tnarket, develop a reputation. An underwriter with '• good" reputation capital is ahle toeam ahigher return either through having lower distribution costs or by being able to
We would like to thank Rob Bloomfield. Tom Dycktnan. John Elliou. Bob Libby. Mark Nelson. Joe Papcrman, the accounting workshop participants ai Cornell, and two anonymous Financial Management referees. charge higher underwriting fees. Carter and Manaster (1990) suggest that the desire to protect their reputation leads higher-quality underwriters to market low-risk IPOs. The same argument applies to auditors. Indeed, Carpenter and Strawser (1971) document that a significant number of firms going public switched from a regional to a "nationally known"" auditor. However, since prestigious auditors charge higher fees (see Beatty, 1989, and Francis and Simon, 1987) , lower-quality fimismay not find il worthwhile lo enlist those auditors" services. Beatty (1989) shows a significantly lower underpricing for IPOs that use reputable auditors. The results we present are consistent with, and extend, both of these earlier efforts.
The second reason for this investigation is related to the effect of reputation on the auditor business decision. Auditors, like investment b;uiks, have reputations to uphold. One of theii" most important business decisions is which IPOs they want to be associated with. Consequently, they have an incentive to screen prospective IPOs and audit only the ones that are less risky (e.g., Titman and Trueman, 1986) . Being associated with poorly performing IPOs is likely to have a negative effect on their reputations.
In addition, auditors who are associated with poorly performing IPOs may be subject to lawsuits by shareholders. (IPOs with greater ex ante uncertainty are more likely to perform poorly.) Larger and more prestigious auditors are more vulnerable to these lawsuits because of their "deeper pockets"' and because of more severe consequences of damaged reputations that prestigious auditors might experience (Dye. 1993) . (On the relationship between initial underpricing and lawsuit avoidance, see Tinic, 1988 .) The FINANCiAL MAN>iGEMENT / WiNTER 1995 likelihood of a lawsuit is not only a function of the IPOs' immediate performancebut also of how they perform during the several years after they begin trading. Hence, reputable auditors have an incentive to associate themselves with IPOs that are less likely to perfbmi poorly in the long run. ' Another reason to examine the relationship between auditor reputation and IPO long-run performance is the evidence that the first day trading price tnay not retlect ihe intrinsic value of the newly traded stock (e.g., Levis, 1993 , Michaely and Shaw, 1994 . and Ritter, 1991 . Therefore. IPOs" long-term value may provide new infonnation about their characteristics that were not revealed hy their first-day pricing. In addition, since both auditors and investment bankers play a significant role in the IPO process, it is interesting to compare the relationship between performance (both short-and long-tenn) of IPOs associated with reputable investment banks to the performance of IPOs associated with reputable auditors. A final motivation for the analysis of long-term pricing is that, while it is difficult for investors to purchase shares at the offering price, they can always purchase shares in the market right after the offerings. Hence, if long-run perfonnance and the auditor's prestige are correlated, an investment strategy can be implemented in IPOs based on an auditor's reputation.
Given our objectives, we conduct the empirical investigation in three stages. In the first stage, we examine whether more prestigious auditors are indeed associated with IPOs that seem a priori less risky. Using an ordered probit analysis, we show that prestigious auditors are more hkely to have clients that are bigger and have lower debt ratios. These clients are also more likely to hire reputable investment bankers to price iuid market their securities. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that reputable audit firms screen prospective IPOs and select for the market those that are less risky.
Since the information available on many firms going public is limited, it is not clear that the audit firm's valuation of the IPO firms will be consistent with the market perception. Thus, in the second stage, we examine whether ihe market indeed perceives as less risky the IPOs that are associated wilh morereputableauditors. Consistent with Beatty (1989) , we find significantly lower underpricing for IPOs that use prestigious auditors. We also show that the cross-sectional variance in return for those IPOs is about one-half of the ones associated with less reputahle auditors. Consistent with this Indeed, Beatty (1993) finds that: 1) It is usually the small auditors who are involved in IPOs that are subsequently delisted and 2) even among this group of auditors (small-client auditors), there are substantially higher tees charged to IPOs ihal iire subsequently in financial distress. Thus, ihey iry-at least p;ulially-to be compensated against this potential cnst. assertion, we find ihai the market-o-book values of IPOs associated with less reputable auditors are significantly higher than those that are associated with the more reputable auditors. We also examine the owneriihip structure conditional on the auditor etnployed. it has hixn suggested (see, for example, Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989, and Leiand and Pyle, 1977 ) that higher fractions held ty insiders reduces the uncertainty ahout the IPO value. We do not find any significant difference in ownership between clients associated with prestigious auditors to the ones associated with less prestigious auditors.
Given the recent evidence coicerning the long-run performance of IPOs (see for exanple, Aggarwal, Leal, and Hernandez, 1993; Loughran anc Ritter, 1995; Michaely and Shaw. 1994; and Ritter. 1991) . it is not clear that IPOs that are a priori perceived as less risky will indeed turn out to he so.
The last dimension of our analysis relates the auditor"s prestige to the long-term characters lies of the firms thai go public. In an ideal world, we could have carried out our investigation by simply looking only at the cross-sectional variance of the IPOs associated with the different auditors. The ones associated with ihc most ])restigious auditors are expected to have the lower variance However, the analysis of the variance is not sufficient for several reasons. First, from the auditor (or the investtnent banker) perspective, the benefits from a stellar IPO may be much lower relative to the costs associated with a poorly performing IPO. both in term of repulatioti and of the costs asi-ociatcd with lawsuits. Second, given the findings of Riiter (1991) conceming the poor long-run perform;mce of IPOs, it is possible that neither the average perfomiance nor the variance reveal the entire picture concerning the long-rin return characteristics of IPOs. Therefore, we examine other moments of the distribution as well.
While we do not find significant differences between the long-run performance of IPOs associated with the Big Eight and Ihe second-lier CPA firms, both groups perform significantly better thiin the IPOs associated with the small CPA firms.2 This poorer pertbrmanct; of the IPOs associated with the less prestigious auditing firms manifests itself not only through a mean two-year excess retum of-37% but also a median performance of -58%. These results tentatively "In the univariate analysis, we use either the Iwo-wuy (Big Eight and non-Big flight) or the three-way (Big Eight, second iier. and small CPA firms) split a,s a surrogate for reputation (following Beatty. 1989) . In the mullivariatc analysis, we are able to use a tinier definition of reputation. It should be poinied out that, since we do iioi have a solid theoretical explanation to the puzzle surrounding IPOs long-term performance, it is difficult to (iraw definite conclusions fr()m the relative long-term performance of the different IPO groups. support the hypothesis that IPOs associated with the more prestigious auditors experience better long-run performance. However, we should keep in mind that the mediaji relums for all of the IPO groups are negative. We show that, on average, even IPOs associated with one of the Big Eight firms underperform the maiket.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I develops the potential interaction between IPO firm's characteristics and ihe auditor prestige. Section II describes the data and methodology. The empirical resuUs are presented in Section III, and Section IV concludes.
I. The Interaction Between IPO Quality and Auditor Choice: Implications
Several reasons have recently been proposed in the literature to explain why a firm would willingly underprice its securities and limit the funds it receives. One common feature to many of these explanations is ihe prediction that IPOs that are subject to greater uncertainty will be associated with greater underpricing. In Baron (1982) . underpricing is seen as the outcome of a principal-agent problem between the issuer and the investment banker. The firm knowingly agrees to be underpriced in order lo give the investment banker the appropriate incentive lo make Ihe optimal distribution of its securities. The greater the uncertainty about the equilibrium value of the firm, the greater the need for the underwriter services and. consequently, the underpricing. Thus, uncertainty about firm value and underpricing are positively correlated. Rock's (1986) explanation of underpricing relics on information asymmetry between informed and uninformed outside investors. The informed investors possess better knowledge about the future prospects of the firm. The information asymmetry leads to the "'winner's curse" problem in which less informed investors usually end up with less successful IPOs. The greater the dispersion of information between these investors' groups, the deeper the average underpricing. In the signaling models (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber. 1989, and Welch, 1989) . good firms try lo convince the market of their true worth through underpricing. Lower-quality firms do nol find it worthwhile to mimic this strategy. As with the previous two classes of models, uncertainty about value and underpricing of the IPO are positively related. The mote precise the information of outside investors about the firm value, the lower the incentive of the insiders to signal, i.e.. to underprice.
Under these scenarios, good firms have the incentive to reduce uncertainly about their value. The choice of auditor (and underwriter) may convey to the market additional information about the firm's quality. There are two reasons why more prestigious auditors may be associated with higher-quality IPOs. First, prestigious auditing firms have their reputations to uphold. Association with lower quality IPOs may adversely affect iheir reputation not only in ihe IPO business but in their entire array of activities. Therefore, those firms are motivated to screen the prospective IPOs and select the less risky ones. Second, prestigious auditing firms charge higher fees. Lower-quality firms will have less incentive to enlist their services because of a lower marginal benefit.
Titman and Trueman (1986) construct a signaling equilibrium model in which the choice of ihe auditor reveals information ahout the value of the issuing firm. Good firms have much to gain from their quality hcing revealed and are therefore willing to pay the higher fees associated with quality auditing. In Carter and Manaster (1990) , the choice of the investment banker increases the precision of infonnation (i.e., reduces variance) revealed to the market. Issuers with lower variance will choose aprestigious underwriter and will pay the higher fees associated with this choice. The very same reasoning can be applied to the choice of auditor. Consequently, choosing a reputable auditor will result in lower underpricing since there is less uncertainty about quality.
To summarize this discussion, there are two closely related issues concerning the relation between the auditor choice and the quality of ihe fimi going public. The first is whether prestigious auditors attempt to associate themselves with less risky IPOs. This decision is made before the IPO shiires are traded and is based on the limited information available lo the auditor prior to the IPO event. The second is the market perception about association between the riskiness of the IPO and auditor reputation. The two may or may not be the same, depending on the information structure. It prestigious auditors indeed select less risky IPOs and if the market interprets it as such, then ihe niiirket perception and the auditor intention will align. Examining these two separately allows us to address this question as well. Thus, the first hypothesis is about the relationship between the e-\ ante characteristics of the IPO and the auditor reputation. The second hypothesis summarizes the relationship between the market perception and the riskiness of the IPO.
Hypothesis 1: IPOs with a lower e.\ ante uncertainty will be associated with more prestigious auditors.
Hypothesis 2: IPOs that are associated with more prestigious auditing firms are perceived by the market as less risky. The choice of auditor may have some implications about Ihe IPOs' long-run perfonnance as well. Being associated with poorly performing IPOs may have a significant, direct cash-flow consequence. Auditors of IPOs that experience substantial reductions in value are subject to lawsuits by equity holders, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes an unusual burden on the auditor. A third party may sue the auditor for any material misrepresentation or omission in the audited financial statements included in the registration statements. The third party does not have to prove that the auditor was negligent or fraudulent or that the decision to invest was based on this statement. (For more details, see Arens and Loebbecke. 1991.) Association with poorly performing IPOs may also have indirect cash flow consequences. The loss to the auditor's reputation may cause other prospective IPO firms to go elsewhere, thereby reducing the auditor's ability to generate other future business as well. Larger, more prestigious auditors are more vulnerable to both the threat of a lawsuit because they have "deeper pockets" (Dye. 1993 ) and the loss of reputation since they have more to lose from a damaged reputation. A recent example appears in The New Yofk Times (January 10, 1994, section Dl). Arthur Andersen & Co. and Deloitte Touche, who were the auditors for the Prudential Bache Energy Income partnership IPO. are subject to a class-action lawsuit seeking $1.1 billion in damages. Dye (1993) also mentioned that in 1992 alone, there was an estimated $30 billion in lawsuits against auditors. This discussionyields the following empirical implication:
Hypothesis 3: IPOs that are associated with more prestigious auditing firms are likely to experience lower variability in their future performance and represent a smaller proportion of extreme losers than do IPOs associated with less prestigious auditors.
II. Data
In this section, we describe our sample selection and present some descriptive statistics ofthe sample firms.
A. Sample Selection
The sample of IPOs was accumulated from the 1984-88 issues of the Directoty ofCorpofate Financing. To remain in the sample, a firm had to meet four requirements:
1. The offer had to be a firm commitment with a share price of at least one dollar.
2. Each unit had to contain only one share of stock (e.g.. no warrants or debt instruments attached).
3. Financial data for the first year after the IPO had to be available from COMPUSTAT or NAARS.
4. The issue was not formed as partnership, closed-end fund, or REIT. We found a total of 1,120 firm-ccmmitment IPOs with a unit price above one dollar. One hundred and eighty-seven IPOs were eliminated from the sample because they included other rights, such as warrants. Twenty-five offerings of ADRs on foreign stocks and 24 IPOs that did not appear on COMPUSTAT were lixcluded. (Out ofthe 24 non-COMPUSTAT firms, 22 sti I traded in 1991, one merged into another firm, and one stopped trading after one year.) Eight hundred and eighty-four fimis met all four requirements.
For each of these tlrms, we calculated both an initial return and a two-year excess returr. The initial return was calculated using the offer price obtained from the Directoiy of Corporate Financing and the cbsing price for the first trading day, which was obtained primarily from CRSP. In any instance where the closing prict was not available from CRSP, the price was obtained from the S&P Daily Stock Price Record. The two-year return was calculated for each stock beginning with the second trading day and ending on the same calendar day two years lat;r. Using daily data, we computed a two-year geometric return. For each firm, we derived an excess return by subtra:ting the geometrically calculated CRSP value-weighted return for the same period.
In a few cases, the firm ceased trading, either because of a takeover or bankruptcy before ttie end of the two-year period. For takeover firms, we used ihe takeover price as the final price for the IPO. Bankrupt firms were assigned a price equal to the fmal per-share distributic n value to shareholders. If none was found, we used a price of zero as the final market price. Calculating the long-run performance over a three-year period instead of a two-year period yields similar results.
We collected financial information on the IPO firms from COMPUSTAT. We obtained missing values from the first annual report filed after the firm went public. There are several financial ratios that are relevant to our study. We used the debt ratio (calculated as the ratio af the long-term debt to total assets), net income over total assets, and market-to-book value as some of our proxies for the firm's e.\ ante risk and financial stability. The percentage of common stocks held by insiders was obtained from Spectrum and the lO-K reports issued immediately after the IPO. (Insider holdings are defined by Spectrum as beneficial holding as reported under the SEC requirements in the proxies, i We collected the issue price and the number of shares offered from the Directory of Corporate Financing.
We based our proxy of the underwriter reputation on its capital. For each IPO. we recorded the leading underwriter as disclosed in the Directory of Corporate Financing. Using the 1986 Security Industry Yearbook, we collected information about the underwriters' capital. Underwriters were ranked from high to low according to their equity capital. We assigned a rank of one to the largest firm, two to the next, and so on. Therefore, a smaller underwriter prestige number indicates the IPO firm used a bigger and. presumably, higher-quality underwriter. We also compared our ranking with the one used by Carter and Manaster (1990) . Seventy-six underwriters are in both groups. The Spearman Rank Correlation coefficient between their ranking and ours was 0.86.
The data about which auditors were employed in our IPO sample were collected from SEC tilings and issues of Who Audits America. Accounting researchers have often used a dichotomous approach when viewing auditing firms: Big Eight firms and '"others." In our univariate tests, we follow this tradition and define the Big Eight firms as prestigious and the non-Big Eight as less prestigious.
However, in recent years, in part because of consolidation in the industry, a three-tier level of firms has developed. For example, the 1988 tolal clients sales for the Big Eight firms ranged from $299,460 million to $683,573 million, while the second tier of seven firms had total clients sales between $2,308 million to $14,576 million. No other fimi reported total clients sales greater than $ 1,000 million.^ As mentioned earlier, perceived differences in audit quality between the Big Eight and smaller firms has led to the Big Eight firms receiving an audit premium over both the second-tier and small firms for similar-size clients."^ To examine the effect of auditor reputation on initial underpricing. Beatty (1989) uses two surrogates. He finds that the Big Eight clients" stocks exhibit lower first-duy retums. However, he also finds that the Big Eight/non-Big Eight dichotomy may measure reputation capital with error for the smaller Big Eight and larger second-tier firms. We therefore repeat our univariate comparison dividing the non-Big Eight firms into two groups. The first group {"second-tier") includes the largest non-Big Eight firms.
Moreover, given our sample size and the data available, we are able to fine-tune the ranking of the auditor's reputation in the multivariate regression analysis. Instead of relying on a two-way (Big Eight and non-Big Eight) or a three-way (Big Eight, second-tier, and small firm) split, we rank all Big Eight and second-tier auditors from zero to 14, based on their 1988 total clients sales. We assign zero to the largest auditor and 14 to the smallest. Because of an insufficient number of
•'We oblained Ihe data on tolal clients sales from the 1988 version of Who Audits Whom. Recenl mergers within ihe Big Eighi and wilh second-tier firms have increased this differenlial even further.
•"We use Ihc lemis •"ihircl-lier" anJ "small firm" imcrchangeably in ihe discussion below.
observations for each of the small auditors, all small-firm auditors are r;mked 15.
B. Descriptive Data of Sample firms
Consistent with prior studies, the 884 IPOs in the sample experienced significant underpricing wilh a first-day retum averaging 1.15%. The average value of the stock issue of $27.68 million and median asset size of $30.26 million documents that IPOs are relatively small firms from diverse industries and represent 284 four-digit SIC codes. Table 1 lists the auditors by number of clients. IPOs are divided into three groups, based on auditor size: Big Eight, second tier, and small firm. The primary difference between the second two groups, other than size, is that the small-firm CPAs are primarily regional operations. Approximately 84% (742 firms) used a Big Eight auditor to go public. This percentage is substantially higher than the 58% reported for IPOs examined by Beatty (1989) during the 1975-84 period. There are twopossible explanations for the differences. First, all" best efforts" underwriting agreements and IPOs with an initial stock price of less than a dollar are eliminated from this study. These often represent the smallest firms, who are more likely to be represented by smaller auditors. Second, substantial consolidations occurred during the 1980s that increased the size differences between the Big Eight and the other audit firms. This may have led to a further migration to Big Eight auditors because of market demands. Of the remaining 142 firms. 81 employed second-tier audit firms, and 61 used small-firm auditors.
Column 3 of Table 1 provides evidence that the differential underpricingof IPOs conditional on auditor type found earlier by Beatty (1989) still persists in this later period. Clients of Big Eight firms experienced the smallest average underpricing with a 6.87% first-day return. In comparison, the first-day return for second-tier and small-firm clients averaged 10.25 and 15.13%.respectively.
III. Results
In this section, we present the empirical analysis regarding our three hypotheses. In the first subsection, we analyze the determination of the auditor choice, ln the second subsection, we address the issue of how the auditor choice affects the market reaction to the new issue, and in the third subsection, we examine the relationship between long-term performance and auditor reputation.
A. Determinants of the Auditor's Choice
If reputable auditors do discriminate, based on some quality attributes, among prospective firms seeking to go public, we would expect thoseauditors to be associated with IPOs that at least a priori seem to be less risky. 
Sample Total 884
Earlier literature Indicates two relevant measures; firm NITA levels. The higher the debt-tD-assets level and the size (e.g.. Ritter. I9S4). and investment banker reputation lower NITA. the riskier the firm is. t should be noted that (e.g..Beatty, l989.CarterandManaster, l990.andMichaely although we collected the information on the last two and Shaw, 1994). Large IPOs and IPOs issued by the more variables from the first annual report after the IPO, we prestigious investment bankers are perceived as less risky.^ believe that these values serve as a good proxy for their These measures are known to investors prior to the IPO date, values prior to tbe IPO. since they an; based on book rather
The two other risk proxies we use are the debt to-assets than on miirkct values. ratio and net income over total assets (NITA. calculated as Mean values for these variables are included in Pane! A the net income before extraordinary items relative to total ofTable 2. We found two significant differences between the assets), both of which are taken from the first annual report Big Eight and the non-Big Eight clients. First, while the Big published after the firm went public. Bankruptcy models. Eight firms took public IPOs with total value of assets of beginning with Altman (1968) . have consistently found thai $326 million, the non-Big Eight clients averaged only $250 investment risk can be explained through debt-to-assets and million. The mean assets" value, however, is highly skewed because of several very large IPOs. The median-size IPÔ Bc;iity(i9S9),forexampk-.aicsasurvey()fA[CPAmcmbcrsthatsLiggests associated with onc of the Big Eight Irms is $33.4 million, thiit underwriters advise clients to switch to one of the Big Eight firms. and $ 13.9 million for the non-Big Eight IPOs. The difference We analyze the determination of the auditor choice using four cv untc proxies for the IPO quality: book value of assets, the prestige ot the leading underwriter (I is ihe mosl prestigious and 179 is the lea,sl presligious), long-term debt to tolal assets (DBTAST), and nel income over total assets (NITA NITA + Year and Industry Dummies is highly significant. There were also significant differences in the proceeds from the IPO between the Big Eight and the non-Big Eight clients with a mean nnirkct value of $29.66 and $17.35 million, respectively. Thediffet^nce is significant with a t-statistic of 5.3. The second difference is the underwriter's reputation. A total of 179 different firms served as the lead underwriter in the 884 IPOs. We find that the larger underwriters were used significantly more often in IPOs certified by Big Eight firms. The mean net income over total assets is 3.42% for the Big Eight IPOs and 2.62% for the non-Big Eight IPOs. Also, the level of long-term debt for the Big Eight clients is 21.3% compared with 24.4% for the non-Big Eight clients. The differences, however, are not statistically significant for these variables.
The univariate analysis performed in Panel A of Table 2 may musk some of these differences. First, we are interested in the marginal effect of each variable on the choice of auditor. Second, the split between Big Eight and non-Big Eight auditors may not be precise enough. To this end. we examine the determination of auditor using an ordered probit regression. The dependent variable is a ranking variable ranging from zero (Price Waterhouse) to 15 (all small CPA firms) based on the auditor's total clients sales. The independent variables are the leading underwriter reputation (one is the underwriter with the highest reputation, and 179 is the lowest), the book value of assets (in logs), long-term debt over total assets, net income over total assets, and a set of industry and year dummy variables.
The ordered probit regression results are reported in Panel B of Table 2 .^' The underwriter prestige variable is positive and significant, indicating that more prestigious underwriters are associated with more prestigious auditors. The negative (and significant) coefficient of the size variable shows that smaller IPOs are more likely to be associated with less prestigious auditors. The debt-to-assets ratio coefficient is positive and significant, consistent with the assertion that larger, more presligious auditors choose to be associated with IPO firms that carry less debt and are consequently less risky. The NITA coefficient is positive but insignificantly different from zero.' 'The ordered probit is the appropriate regression technique to use, given thai Ihe indt-pcncicnt variahle is a discrcie categorization wiih soEne ranking order. We liave also considered an allernalive measure of rclurn on asscis: Instead ol' net income to total as.seis, we measure the net income plus iiilerest expenses (after la\es| relalive lo total a.ssels. The re,sulls are practically ihe same as ihe ones reported in Panel B of Tahle 2, Finally, the OLS regression yields very similar results. •'Initial return is calculated as the difference between the closing price on (he first day of trading and the otTe • price, relative to the offer price. MVBV equals the market-io-book value ol cotnmon equity. Institutional and insider holdings are the ptrcentage of shares held, a.s reported in Specn-um for the month after the offering.
We repeated the experiment when the dependent viiriahle is either zero (for a Big Eight auditor), one (for a second-tier auditor), or two (for a small-firm auditor). None of our conclusions changed.
These results seem to confirm Hypothesis I: Larger more prestigious CPA firms tend to associate themselves with IPOs that are a priori less risky.'B
. The Effect of Auditor Choice on the Market Reaction to the Public Offering
Judging from the market reaction to the IPOs on the first day of trading, it seems that the market indeed perceives IPOs associated with the Big Eight as less risky than other IPOs. As we report in the first row of Table 3 , the underpricing increases as the prestige of the auditor decreases. The average underpricing is 6.99r and 12.49^ forBig Eight clients and non-Big Eight clients, respectively. The difference is significant with a t-statistic of 2.97."T woothervariables. insiders'ownership and institutional holdings, have been mentioned in ihe literature as correlated with risk of the IPO. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) 
and Leland
In contrast to HyptHhesis I (and to our empirical findings), Datar. Fellhain. and Hughes (1991) sugjicst ihal the value of audited reports increase in Ihe ri.skincss of" future cash tlows. This leads to a prediction lh;il riskier tiims will he more likely to employ a higher-quality auditor. However, lests by Felthani. Hughes, and Simunic (1991) finit only weak support for this assenion. This prediction is also inconsisient with prior empirical findings regarding the association between underwriters and the type of flnns that go public; Higher-prestige underwriters are associated with less, rather than more, risky IPOs.
Also consistent with this assertion is the finding that the tn;irkct-lo-book value (MVBV) is sijiniticantly higher for !POs that arc not associated with one of the Big Eight CPA firms.Noti-Big Eight clients are considered riskier, having rclalively fewertangibic assets: therefore, their markel-to-book value is higher. Finns wilh less tangible assets, high levels of go(xi will, and patents are likely lo have higher market-to-book value. These firms are usually riskier, as well.
and Pyle (1977) suggest that outside investors' uncertainty can be partially resolved by a fiigher level of insider ownership. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Rock (1986) maintain that a higher percentage held by institutional investors is indicative of a higher-q jality IPO. Empirically, we do not find any significant cifferencc in either the institutional ownership or the percentage held by insiders between IPOs associated with the Big Eight and those associated with the non-Big Eight: Institutions own 27.17% of stocks of IPOs audited by Big Eight fimis and 28.4.'i'7( of stocks in the ones audited by ont of the non-Big Eight firms. Insider ownership in the mm-Big Eight clients is 41.48%, compared to an average holding of 37.84% in the Big Eight clients.
The results in Beatty (1989) suggest that there might be an inverse relationship between non-Big Eight auditor prestige and the need to change to a Big Eight auditor. Stnall firms with regional auditors might have the most to gain by switching to a Big Eight auditor. Indeed, Carpenter and Strawser (1971) find that the primary reason firms change auditors prior to an iPO is to obtain the services of a " nationally known firm," This survey would suggest that the small-firm atiditor clients would have the most to gain by changing auditors, since stnall-firm auditors do not have a national presence. However, these tlrms, being generally stnaller iti size, may also have a harder time finding a reputable auditor (either because the expense outweighs the benefit or because reputable auditors will shy away). Thus, it is likely thai such finms will have he highest degree oie.x ante uticertainty and. therefore, he highest degree of underpricing. On the other hand, a firm employing a second-tier audit firm may believe il can convey quality without ending a relationship with i s current accountant. It might view an auditor chiuige as ei.her unnecessary or too Initial retum is calctiiated from Ihe offer price ant! the price ai Ihe end of the first trading day. The variance is calculated based on the within-group retum differences. The firm-size ranking is shown in parentheses.
Firm

Big Eight
Peat Marwick Mitchell (4) Arthur Andersen (2) Coopers & Lybrand (3) Emst&Whinney (5) Arthur Young (7) Price Waterhouse (1) Touche Ross (8 costly. We examine this possibility by first calculating the mean first-day return for each of the three auditors subsiimpies. The Big Eight clients experience tbe smallest initial-day return (6.87'7c) followed by tbe second-tier clients with an initial return of 10.25%. Tbe small-tlrm clients experience tbe bigbest initial return, 15.13%. All differences are significant. Consistent witb the analysis in tbe previous section, the Big Eight clients use the most prestigious underwriters, followed by tbe second-tier clients. Tbe differences in underwriters' prestige among tbe tbree groups are significant at tbe 0.05 level. Also, the market-to-book value is significantly bigher for tbe small-firm clients than forthe Big Eight clients. Tbe level of institutional and insider holdings is insignificantly different among the thiee groups.
There are two reasons, bowever. wby examination of tbe mean retum alone may not reveal the entire picture. First, it is possible and quite likely tbat from tbe auditor's perspective, a successful IPO is one that docs not experience negative first-day return, wbile putting less weight on tbe extent to wbicb its return is positive (as long as it is positive). In other words, the cosl associated wilb bad perfonncrs is higher tban tbe gain associated witb good performers. Thus, the mean and varituice of Ibe distribution may not reveal tbe entire picture regarding the relationship between auditor reputation and IPO quality. Second, recent literature (e.g., Hanley, Kumar, and Sequin. 1993, and Rudd, 1993) suggests tbat the return distribution of IPOs on tbe first few days of trading is bighly non-normal. For tbese two reasons, we analyze tbe return distribution, conditional on the auditor's reputation, in more detail.
We first calculate the median and tbe second, tbird. and fourtb moments of the distribution. As expected, for eacb of tbe CPA groups, tbe median first-day return (reported in Table 4} isconsiderably below tbe mean: a median of 2.13% for tbe Big Eight IPOs. 2.60 for the second-tier IPOs, and 7.S4 for tbe small-firm IPOs. Tbe cross-sectional variance of the Big Eight clients is about half the variance of the small-firm clients or of tbe second-tier firms (also reported in Table 4 ). The .skewness of the Big Eight IPOs is 3.472, compared with 4.177 for tbe second-tier and 1.012 for tbe small-firm IPOs. All are significantly different from zero (symmetric distribution) at the 0.001 level. Likewise. Ibe kurtosis of tbe Big Eight, second-tier, and small-firm IPOs is 16.37, 20.87. and 0.81. compared witb a kurtosis of 3 for a normal distribution. The Big Eight and tbe second-tier kurtosis is significantly different from 3 at tbe 0.001 level.
In Eigure I, we plot the first-day return distribution. Three conclusions can be drawn from tbe figure. First, the unconditional distribution is higbly asymmetric. Only 19.6% of tbe observations arc below zero, 11.6% of tbe IPOs in the sample experience no price movement, and almost 70% of 15,00% -
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PERCENT RETURN the IPOs experience positive price movement on the first day. Second, the IPOs" lirsl day retum distribulion differs across Ihe three auditing groups. The small-rirni IPOs have more observations at the two extremes. More than 28% of the small-firm clients experience a first-day return above 20%, compared with lO''^ of the Big Eight clients. More than 5% of the small-firm clients experienced a first-day return of less than 59c compared with 2'/( of the Big Eight clients and 1.5% of the second-tier clients. Third, the small-firm IPOs' retums experience the least peakiness at zero (consistent with their relatively low kurtosis). If price support can account for this evidence, as suggested by Rudd (1993), then ii seems thai IPOs associated with more prestigious auditors are stabilized to a larger extent than the ones associated with less reputable auditors.
To analyze the marginal effect of the auditor type, we run a multivariate regression where the independent variables are the auditor lypc (CPA), the log of the offer size (lvalue), the underwriter prestige variable (Underwriter), and year and industry dummies. The largest CPA firm is assigned the value of zero, and the smallest second-tier auditor is assigned the value of 14. All small CPA firms are grouped together and assigned the value of 15. The dcpendcni variable is the first-day return (return). The results are presented in regression (I). The auditor's prestige variable is positive and significant. indicati[ig that lower-prestige auditors* IPOs experience higher initial returns even after controlling lor the size of the IPO and the prestige of its leading underwriter, This result is consistent with the univariate analysis. It is also consistent with our findings in the previous section. Prestigious auditors are associated with less risky IPOs. The analysis of this section indicates that the market indeed perceives it as such. Similar to previous studies (e.g., Michaely and Shaw, 1994) , the positive cwfticient on the underwriter reputation variable indicates that more reputable underwriters bring to the market less risky IPOs.
Consistent with Michaely and Sbaw (1994) , we find ihat the univariate analysis shows that larger iPOs experience lower first-day return. However, in the multivariate analysis, when the underwriter prestige is also accounted for, the coefficient on IPO size reverses itself. This result is consistent with the assertion that, for a given investment banker and auditor prestige level, larger issues show more underpricing. These results can be interpreted as showing Ihat investment banker and auditor reputations resolve some of tbe uncertainty about the quality of the IPO. Larger issues, however, require greater distribution efforts by the investment banker (Baron, 1982) and the dispersion of the issue to a larger group of investors; hence, there is deeper underpricing. It is also possible that the positive and significant size coefficient is, at lea.st partially, a result of the "partial adjustment" phenomenon (Hanley, 1993, and Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter, 1988) . Alter the auditor and investment banker arc chosen and the preliminary prospectus is issued, if the demand is strong, there is a higher initial retum, and the offering price and number of shares are sometimes adjusted upward.'" To summarize. Hypothesis 2-that the market perceives IPOs Ihat are associated with more prestigious firms as less risky-is borne out by the data. These firms are also brought to market with lower market-to-book values, which are usually associated with lower-risk firms. Their average first-day return and their cross-sectional variance are both lower. Eurther, there are fewer IPOs associated wilh more prestigious firms experiencing extreme negative first-day returns compared to those ass(x:iated with the small-firm auditors. Even after controlling for the prestige of the leading underwriter, issue size, and its industry, we find that first-day retum and auditor reputation are negatively correlated.
C. The Association Between IPOs Long-Run Performance and the Choice of Auditor
The evidence presented thus far is consistent with the assertion that more prestigious CPA firms are associated with less risky IPOs. Judging from the market's reaction to those IPOs, the market also seeins to perceive them as less risky. The third issue is whether those intentions (by the audit firms) and expectations (by the market) are also consistent with the IPOs" long-run perfonnance. As we have argued in the previous section, it is quite likely that from the perspective of the CPA firms, long run performance is a more relevant measure than the initial-day performance.
Even though the Big Eight clients were larger and used more prestigious underwriters, no differences were found in future stock perfonnance. Both the Big Eight and non-Big Eight clients iinderperformcd the market by 13.9% and 13.4%. respectively, during tbe first two years after the IPO. While only the Big Eight client stock performance is significantly ditfercnt from zero, ihcre are no significant
We rerun regression (I) with NITA and long-lerni debt to assets. The CPA Loefficicnt remain positive and significanl. differences between the two groups. It is worth comparing these results to Michaely and Shaw (1994) and Ritter (199!) . Ritter finds similar underperformance for a group of firms that went public between 1970 and 1984. Since his efforts were not focused on the relationship between long-term performance and auditors, his analysis docs not address this issue. Michaely and Shaw (1994) show that the long-run performance of IPOs issued by reputable investment bankers is significantly better than the pertbmiance of those issued by less reputable investment bankers. Moreover. IPOs issued by reputable investment bankers performed as well as the market. This does not seem to be the case with IPOs that are associated with reputable auditors.''
We also analyzed the long-term performance based on a three-way split of auditors. The clients of the small firm auditors demonstrated the poorest future stock performance. They averaged a -37.24% return. The Big Eight clients came next with an average performance of -13.91%. The second-tier clients actually outperformed the market by 4.53%. The difference between the latter two groups, however, is not significant. TTie stronger performance of the second-tier clients is surprising, considering they had smaller stock issues and used less prestigious underwriters. To isolate the marginal effect of the auditor reputation on performance, we examine the conditional effect of the CPA firm via a regression analysis.
The dependent variable is the two-year excess return (2 yr. EXR). and the independent variables are the auditor reputation (CPA). zero for most prestigious and 15 for ieust prestigious; the log of the offer size (lvalue); the underwriter prestige (Underwriter), one is the most prestigious and 179 is the least prestigious; and a sel of year and industry dummy variables. The underwriter's coefficient is significantly negative, implying that lower-prestige underwriters are associated with IPOs whose performance is poorer in the long term. The auditor coefficient, on the other hand, is insignificantly It is worth noting at this stage of the analysis that, since we do not have a solid understanding of the long-run perfortiiatice of IPO firms (average negative excess returns), conclusions Inim our empirical analysis about auditor reputation effect shotild he made with caution. different from zero, indicating that the long-run performance may not be related to the auditor's reputation. However, it is possible that the insignificance of the auditor coefficient is due to the nonmonotonic relation between long-run performance and auditor's reputation documented earlier.
We investigate this issue further by examining the long-term retum distribution in more detail.
As the infonnation in Figure 2 and Table 5 show, the superior performance of the second tier group over the Big Eight group is not always supported by our alternative measures. The median two-year extess retum is -38.9% for the Big Eight IPOs and-36.4% for the second-tier IPOs. (The low median of the small-tier IPO j;roup is consistent with prior analysis: Their median twc-year excess return is -58.2%.) More than two-thirds of the entire IPO sample underperformed the market in the firf;t two years of operation. Of the issues associated with the small CPA firms. 71.13% underpertbmied the market, compared with 61.73% and 68.11% of the issues associated with the second-tier and Big Eight firms. On the high end, 23.46^^of the second-tier IPOs outpertbrmed the market by more than 50%-. Only 18.33% of the IPOs associated with the Big Eight firms and 11.48% of the small-firm IPOs experienced such a performance.
As Table 5 shows, the poorperfbrmajice of the Big Eight clients is not unique to a particular (!^PA firm. The two-year mean excess return is negative for seven out of eight firms" IPOs, and the median is negative for all eight. This is striking. The small-firm IPOs had b; far the lowest two-year mean and median excess return (-37.24% and -58.23% respectively). It is interesting to note, however, that the cross-sectional variance of the second-tier IPOs is higher than the other two groups' variance, [t seems that the slightly better performance of the second-t er clients over the Big Eight clients is due to small number oJ outliers that experienced an excess retum of over 1(X)%. It is important to recognize, however, that most of our measures (with the exception of the mean excess return for the second-tier clients) indicate poor performance by all three groups.
We can summarize the findings of this subsection as follows. First, over two-thirds of tlie IPOs in our sample underperformed the market by all measures in the first two years of operations. Those ihat are associated with the small-firm CPAs experienced the w jrst perfonnance with a mean excess return of -37% and a median excess retum of -58%. Both the Big Fight clients ani the second-tier clients underperformed the market. The second-tier clients experienced a slightly better perfonrriance. but the difference is insignificant. Thus, our investigation of the third hypothesis-that auditor prestige is positively related to long-run performajice-yields less-than-crisp results. While the lowest prestige CPA group is indeed associated with the The two-year excess return (D2) is equal to the geometrically calculated tlrm retum minus the CRSP value-weighted market retum. The variance is calculated based on the within-group retum differences. The ranking based on firm size is shown in parentheses.
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Peat Marwick Mitchell (4) Anhur Andersen (2) Coopers & Lybrand (3) Emst&Whinney (5) Arthur Young (7) Price Waterhouse ( worst-performing IPOs, it is disturbing to note that even the most prestigious CPA firms are associated with many poorly performing IPOs. These results are also in contrast with the relationship between the underwriters' reputations and long-tenii pertbrmance of IPOs. As the multivariate regression indicates, more reputable underwriters are associated with better long-term performance IPOs. (See also Michaely and Shaw. 1994) .
IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates three aspects of the relationship between auditors' prestige and the characteristics of the IPOs they take to the market. First, the theory tells us that IPOs associated with prestigious auditors are less risky. The reason is that prestigious auditors who wish to protect their reputation will screen the prospective IPOs and choose the less risky ones. Good firms have the incentive to pay the higher fees charged by those auditors so that theirquaiity will be revealed to the market. Our results support this assertion. We find that the more prestigious auditing firms attempt to associate themselves with IPOs that are larger and have more tangible assets; whose underwriters are more reputable; and that, therefore, seem less risky.
Second, we investigate whether the market recognizes that an association with higher-prestige CPA firms conveys some information about the IPO riskiness. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that auditor's ];)restige and underpricing are inversely related. These IPOs also experience lower cross-sectional variance and their market-to-book value is lower.
The third aspect of the relationship concerns those IPOs' long-term performance. Auditors cf IPOs that experience substantial reduction in value are subiect to potential lawsuits by equity holders. This is particularly relevant to the big, reputable auditors since they have "deeper pockets" and are therefore more likely to be subjected to such lawsuits and because they have more to lose from a damaged reputation. It is harder to draw definite conclusions from this aspect of our investigation. Wi; find that the majority of IPOs, regardless of their auditors, underperform the market. A priori, one would expect that a lower proportion of IPOs associated with the more prestigious auditors will underperform the market. Consistent with this hypothesis. we find that the IPOs associated with the less reputable auditors perform the worst.
Finally, we oiler some (tentative) suggestions to financial managers and investors concerning the implications of the paper's findings. First. IPOs associated with one of the Big Eight firms experience lower underpricing, even after controlling for size and the prestige of the underwriter. That is, those IPOs "leave less money on the table." From this perspective, all else being equal, it i:; worthwhile for a firm that is consideritig going public to associate itself with one of the more reputable auditing firms.'-From the investors" perspective, the evidence in Michaely and Shaw (1994), Riiter (1991) . and this paper, appears to suggest that one should not purchase IPOs in the open market at all, regardless of the auditor associated with them. Taking the desire to purchase IPOs as a given (as illogical as it may be), there is no good reason why IPOs associated with one of the Big Eight firms should command a premium over an IPO associated with one of the second-tier firms. In the long term, the IPOs associated with the second-tier firms perform at least as well as the ones associated with one of the Big Eight firms. Finally, a buy-and-hold strategy of an IPO associated with a small-tier CPA firm has more than a 70% chance of underpertbrming the market, and the expected retum is also negative.
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